A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market

Data traffic demand over the Internet is increasing rapidly, and it is changing the pricing model between internet service providers (ISPs), content providers (CPs) and end users. One recent pricing proposal is sponsored data plan, i.e., when CP negotiates with the ISP on behalf of the users to remove the network subscription fees so as to attract more users and increase the number of advertisements. As such, a key challenge is how to provide proper sponsorship in the situation of complex interactions among the telecommunication actors, namely, the advertisers, the content provider, and users. To answer those questions, we explore the potential economic impacts of this new pricing model by modeling the interplay among the advertiser, users, and the CPs in a game theoretic framework. The CP may have either a subscription revenue model (charging end-users) or an advertisement revenue model (charging advertisers). In this work, we design and analyze the interaction among CPs having an advertisement revenue as a non-cooperative game, where each CP determines the proportion of data to sponsor and a level of credibility of content. In turn, the end-users demand for the content of a CP depends not only on their strategies but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose an iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Nash equilibrium point in a distributed manner. Numerical investigation shows the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium point and corroborates the fact that sponsoring content may improve the CPs outcome

A game theoretic framework for controlling the behavior of a content seeking to be popular on social networking sites

Over the years, people are becoming more dependent on Online Social Networks, through whom they constitute various sorts of relationships. Furthermore, such areas present spaces of interaction among users; they send more messages and posts showing domains they are interested in to guarantee the level of their popularity. This popularity depends on its own rate, the number of comments the posted topic gets but; also on the cost a user has to pay to accomplish his task on this network. However, the selfish behavior of those subscribers is the root cause of competition over popularity among those users. In this paper, we aim to control the behavior of a social networks users who try their best to increase their popularity in a competitive manner. We formulate this competition as a non-cooperative game. We porpose an efficient game theoretical model to solve this competition and find a situation of equilibrium for the said game

Joint Beacon Power and Beacon Rate Control Based on Game Theoretic Approach in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), each vehicle broadcasts its information periodically in its beacons to create awareness for surrounding vehicles aware of their presence. But, the wireless channel is congested by the increase beacons number, packet collision lost a lot of beacons. This paper tackles the problem of joint beaconing power and a beaconing rate in VANETs. A joint utilitybased beacon power and beacon rate game are formulated as a non-cooperative game and a cooperative game. A three distributed and iterative algorithm (Nash Seeking Algorithm, Best Response Algorithm, Cooperative Bargaining Algorithm) for computing the desired equilibrium is introduced, where the optimal values of each vehicle beaconing power and beaconing rate are simultaneously updated at the same step. Extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the equilibrium and give some insights on how the game parameters may vary the game outcome. It is demonstrated that the Cooperative Bargaining Algorithm is a fast algorithm that converges the equilibrium

Evaluation of different extractors of features at the level of sentiment analysis

Sentiment analysis is the process of recognizing and categorizing the emotions being expressed in a textual source. Tweets are commonly used to generate a large amount of sentiment data after they are analyzed. These feelings data help to learn about people's thoughts on a various range of topics. People are typically attracted for researching positive and negative reviews, which contain dislikes and likes, shared by the consumers concerning the features of a certain service or product. Therefore, the aspects or features of the product/ service play an important role in opinion mining. Furthermore to enough work being carried out in text mining, feature extraction in opinion mining is presently becoming a hot research field. In this paper, we focus on the study of feature extractors because of their importance in classification performance. The feature extraction is the most critical aspect of opinion classification since classification efficiency can be degraded if features are not properly chosen. A few scientific researchers have addressed the issue of feature extraction. And we found in the literature that almost every article deals with one or two feature extractors. For that, we decided in this paper to cover all the most popular feature extractors which are BOW, N-grams, TF-IDF, Word2vec, GloVe and FastText. In general, this paper will discuss the existing feature extractors in the opinion mining domain. Also, it will present the advantages and the inconveniences of each extractor. Moreover, a comparative study is performed for determining the most efficient combination CNN/extractor in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 measure

Sentiment Analysis of Covid19 Tweets Using A MapReduce Fuzzified Hybrid Classifier Based On C4.5 Decision Tree and Convolutional Neural Network

This contribution proposes a new model for sentiment analysis, which combines the convolutional neural network (CNN), C4.5 decision tree algorithm, and Fuzzy Rule-Based System (FRBS). Our suggested method consists of six parts. Firstly we have applied several pre-processing techniques. Secondly, we have used the fastText method for vectoring the analysed tweets. Thirdly, we have implemented the CNN for extracting and selecting the pertinent features from the tweets. Fourthly, we have fuzzified the CNN output using the Gaussian Fuzzification (GF) method for coping with vague data. Then we have applied fuzziness C4.5 for creating the fuzziness rules. Finally, we have used the General Fuzziness Reasoning (GFR) approach for classifying the new tweets. In summary, our method integrates the advantages of CNN and C4.5 techniques and overcomes the shortcomings of ambiguous data in the tweets using FRBS, which is consists of three-phase: fuzzification phase using GF, inference mechanism using fuzziness C4.5, and defuzzification phase using GFR. Also, to give our approach the ability to deal with the massive data, we have implemented it on the Hadoop framework of five computers. The experiential findings confirmed that our model operates excellently compared to other chosen models form the literature

Analysis of Competition Fronting the Popularity of Content in Social Networks

In the telecommunications domain they are several providers, but customers seeking those that there are good services. In this paper, a study is seeking on two types of providers: content providers CPs and Internet Service Providers ISPs. In this study, we analyzed the impact of Selfishness of Content Providers and Internet Service Providers on their strategies of Price and QoS on their decision strategies. Yet, we formulate our problem as a non-cooperative game among multiple CPs, multiple ISPs competing for the same market. We prove through a detailed analysis uniqueness of pure Nash Equilibrium (NE). Furthermore, a fully distributed algorithm to converge to the NE point is presented. In order to quantify how efficient is the NE point, a detailed analysis of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is adopted to ensure the performance of the system at equilibrium. Finally, we provide an extensive numerical study to point out the importance of QoS and credibility in the market and the in-fluence of the existing economic relationship between content providers and Internet service providers

A Game Theory Approach for UAV Based Flying Access Networks

International audienc

Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers

With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers’ policies

The Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks

Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution